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ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on key areas for reducing transport costs in
Southern Africa emerging from recent research on cross-border
freight between Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and
Zimbabwe. We consider the impact of competition, border delays
and lack of return loads on transport rates which could be
reduced significantly through increased availability of return loads
for transporters, linked to growing industrial capacity in each
country. Furthermore, increased competition and reducing delays
for transporters contributed to a large reduction in transport rates
between Lusaka and Johannesburg, with similar effects from
Malawi. Margins charged in refrigerated transport are high due to
low levels of rivalry and lack of return loads. Measures to reduce
border constraints and enable greater rivalry between transporters
from different countries could have a downward effect on
transport rates in the region which are shown to be above
benchmarks for efficient transport.
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1. Introduction
In some cases, the only difference between the price of deep sea imports landed in South
Africa and those goods from neighbouring countries is the high overland transport cost
between Southern African countries (‘the region’). Furthermore, the share of South
Africa’s diversified manufacturing exports going to SADC (Southern African Develop-
ment Community) has risen to around 30% in 2015 from 15% in 2005.1 The vast majority
of goods, and 70–90% of agricultural goods in Africa (World Bank, 2015), are transported
using trucks. As such, the costs of road transport are especially important to understand in
the context of regional integration, urbanisation, and opportunities for production and
supply across a wider regional market linked to rising food consumption and incomes
in the region.
The SADC Industrialisation Strategy and Roadmap recognises high transport costs and
inefficiency in logistics systems as constraints on the development of cross-border value
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chains (SADC, 2015). However, it underplays the importance of efficient and affordable
road freight to the success of such a strategy. This paper focuses on key issues relating
to reducing transport costs in Southern Africa emerging from recent research on cross-
border freight between Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.2
Specifically, we consider the impact of competition, border delays and a lack of return
loads on transport rates.
The paper assesses the key determinants of high cross-border road freight prices within
Southern Africa, including the roles of regulation and competition bottlenecks. We dis-
tinguish between rates for perishable food and commodity transportation by truck
between key areas of production and consumption within the region which is most rel-
evant for understanding inter-regional trade and development. The assessment does not
consider freight to and from ports for overseas exports and imports. We focus on
freight between Harare (Zimbabwe), Johannesburg (South Africa), Lilongwe (Malawi),
Lusaka (Zambia) and Maputo (Mozambique).3
We show that rates could be reduced significantly with increased availability of return
loads for transporters in the region, linked to growing industrial capacity in each
country. The implications for regional integration and industrial development in Southern
Africa are therefore assessed. Increased competition and reducing delays at border crossings
for transporters contributed to a large reduction in transport rates between Lusaka and
Johannesburg, with similar effects fromMalawi also.Margins charged in refrigerated trans-
port are high due to low levels of rivalry and lack of return loads, amongst other factors.
Measures to reduce border constraints could have an immediate downward effect on trans-
port rates in the region which are shown to be above our benchmark for efficient transport.
The insights on each market, as well as transport rates and costs are drawn from infor-
mation gathered in 33 detailed interviews of transport companies and brokers, industry
associations and users of transport services including grocery retailers conducted in
each country in 2015. The underlying research relied on verifying and triangulating infor-
mation from desktop research and interviews in each country to inform the key findings,
particularly given a lack of reliable, comparable transport cost and price data across the
countries.
The paper is structured as follows: we briefly review the main issues identified in pre-
vious studies on transport rates and trade in Africa and the region, and highlight the con-
tribution of this paper to these debates. We then describe the structure of markets in
regional transport before presenting the recent evidence on road transport prices and
costs and the impact of greater competition in section 4. Section 5 assesses the main
additional causes of high freight rates, Section 6 draws together the main findings and
implications for industrial development and integration. Section 7 concludes.
2. Transport costs, infrastructure and drivers of transport rates
Poor road infrastructure, high trade barriers and high transport costs constrain economic
development in Africa and have undermined the formation of integrated regional markets
2This paper is largely based on two working papers as indicated.
3There is reference throughout the paper to routes to and from Maputo in Mozambique although this is not a central focus
of this paper. Furthermore, information regarding Mozambique is drawn from interviews in the other countries with
market participants operating on Mozambique routes.
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(Mbabazi et al., 2008; UNCTAD, 2013; UNECA, 2013). Given the historical negative econ-
omic impact of poor road networks, some estimates show that interventions to upgrade
and integrate road networks in Sub-Saharan Africa could lead to an expansion in overland
trade of around $250 billion over 15 years based on conservative assumptions (Buys et al.,
2010). Importantly, the increase in trade and other economic benefits such as employment
is expected to far exceed the costs of upgrading infrastructure (Buys et al., 2010). Devel-
opment of quality infrastructure can also contribute to increased productivity and output,
which has effects in terms of lifting local and rural economies and in some cases contrib-
utes to reducing inequality and poverty (Calderón & Servén, 2008).4
Domestic economies in the region are relatively small and characterised by high entry
barriers, concentration and anticompetitive conduct in key industries (Roberts et al.,
2017). It is therefore important to consider that high transport costs, trade barriers and
protectionist measures can reinforce the market power of incumbent firms and entrench
concentration in local markets (Gal, 2001; World Bank-ACF, 2016).
Prices for road freight are lower in Southern Africa than other regions in Africa
although major routes are highly profitable suggesting a large margin between transport
prices and costs (Teravaninthorn & Raballand, 2009). Some of the key costs such as
labour and vehicles are lower relative to developed and developing countries, although
fuel prices may be comparable or higher (Teravaninthorn & Raballand, 2009; Foster &
Briceño-Garmendia, 2010). Improvement in road infrastructure contributes to better out-
comes, however, road infrastructure on major cross-border trucking corridors is generally
considered to be adequate in Southern Africa (Lall et al., 2009; Teravaninthorn & Rabal-
land, 2009). Instead, high costs are largely driven by regulatory and competition con-
straints (Teravaninthorn & Raballand, 2009; Foster & Briceño-Garmendia, 2010;
Gwilliam, 2011). Improving the efficiency of border procedures, addressing bottlenecks
and enhancing the efficacy of administrative systems are critical areas for intervention
(Byiers & Vanheukelom, 2014). Measures to increase vehicle utilisation and cut travel
times by reducing delays at border posts also contribute (Foster & Briceño-Garmendia,
2010; JICA, 2010; Byiers & Vanheukelom, 2014). Delays at border posts, multiple stop-
pages, corruption, over-regulation and time spent in truck queues actually increase trans-
port rates on cross-border routes by 10–30% even though operating costs are not
necessarily higher than in Europe, which is in line with our own assessment (Foster &
Briceño-Garmendia, 2010).
Arrangements in transport should be understood as part of integrated value chains
where government policy and market power at one level of the value chain can affect com-
petitive outcomes in transport. For example, in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia the struc-
ture of government fertiliser subsidy programmes and anticompetitive arrangements in
fertiliser trading have restricted competition in transport (Ncube et al., 2017). On the
other hand, regulation to ease entry in trucking and open up to competition from different
countries reduced trucking rates on certain cross-border routes from Zambia (Raballand
et al., 2008; Ncube et al., 2017).
We extend the analysis in previous papers to include recent information on refrigerated
transportation which has generally not been assessed. This refers to transportation by
refrigerated container or trailer (‘reefer’) of perishable goods (focusing on food) including
4There are important caveats in terms of measurement and heterogeneity, usefully outlined by Calderón & Servén (2008).
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fresh, frozen or chilled goods primarily. This aspect of freight has become increasingly
important as the trade and consumption of imported perishables increases in the countries
considered. The quality and efficiency of logistics systems is especially important in
refrigerated transport given time- and temperature-sensitivity (Zamparini et al., 2011).
3. The structure of markets and competition between transporters
3.1 Non-refrigerated transport
We focus here on characterising forwarders/brokers and truckers and their links to custo-
mers in the region based on the interviews conducted. Trucking companies with less than
10 vehicles are considered small and the largest firms have fleets of more than one
hundred trucks. The largest trucking and forwarding firms typically have depots and oper-
ations in each country and are largely ‘regional’ (rather than limited to a single country) in
their strategies and operations. For example, Imperial Logistics from South Africa is ver-
tically integrated throughout the logistics chain either directly or through various subsidi-
aries spread across the region, leveraging capacity in terms of fleet size, warehousing
capacity and management systems to win major contracts with customers. Large operators
of this nature carry far greater bargaining power with customers than smaller operators,
given their broad service offering which customers value. This often means that corporate
customers may pay more for these services, although this is balanced by the fact that trans-
porters report charging reduced rates if it means they can secure longer term contracts and
higher volumes from a customer.
Forwarding agents and brokers are generally concerned with coordinating handling,
off/loading, customs and port clearance, warehousing, documentation, sea freight and
transportation for clients. The large forwarding firms typically have long-standing
relationships with large transport groups that tend to specialise in road transport rather
than the provision of related services. There are also small ‘briefcase’ operators that typi-
cally service one-off importers and exporters, although they sometimes compete for larger
clients through undercutting on prices.
The structure of markets for forwarding and trucking differ by country. There are
specific features of each market in terms of major participants and concentration which
affect competitive outcomes, some of which are considered below:
(a) In Malawi, there are around 150 registered agents although only eight of these can be
considered large, diversified operators with multinational presence. There are less
than 10 domestic firms with large cross-border transport operations, including AS
Investments (over 700 trucks specialising in dry goods and break bulk), Siku
Transport, J&J Africa (over 1000 trucks across the region), R Gaffar Transport and
Trans-tech.
(b) Since the early 2000s there has been consolidation of the largest transport companies
in Mozambique from 72 in 2003 to around 20 major firms being represented by the
main industry association of large transporters (ASTROCAMA) in 2014, and there is
extensive subcontracting to smaller operators (Meeuws, 2004; VillageReach, 2014).
The largest firms in road transport such as Lalgy, SuperSteel and J&J Africa (based
in Mozambique) have fleets which are close to or exceed 1000 vehicles. Increasingly
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Mozambican transporters have contested routes to Malawi in particular through
offering cheap rates to the Beira and Maputo ports, whereas South African and Zim-
babwean transporters had a stronger presence in the early 2000s (Meeuws, 2004).
(c) The South African market comprises a relatively large number of transporters of
various sizes, although there are around seven main logistics companies in the indus-
try: namely, Imperial Logistics, Value Logistics, Barlow World, Unitrans, Super
Group, DHL and Cargo Carriers (Vilakazi & Paelo, 2017a). The largest companies
are vertically integrated with operations throughout Southern Africa. The primary
industry association, the Road Freight Association, has approximately
450 members and it is estimated that there are around 16 000 goods vehicle operators
(Vilakazi & Paelo, 2017b).
(d) In Zambia brokers and large transport companies control access to the main con-
tracts in copper, chrome and other minerals for exportation. The main truckers’
association has over 60 members comprising the largest transporters with total
vehicle capacity of approximately 2100.
(e) In Zimbabwe brokers control access to the main contracts in tobacco and chrome,
and subcontract to preferred transporters. Preferred transporters are in most cases
the major transport firms including Cargo Carriers, GDC Whelson, J&J Africa, Leo
Pack and Truck Africa (Imperial group). The main truckers association has around
90 members accounting for 5000 vehicles.
(f) The main regional or multinational firms operating in forwarding include: Bridge
Shipping, Manica, Bollore Africa, Barloworld, UTI, CWT-Aquarius, Alliance. Truck-
ing companies with the largest operations across the region include: Bridge Shipping,
J&J Africa, Barloworld, GDC Whelson (Super Group), AS Investments, Imperial
Logistics, Unitrans and Trans-tech.
In each country, there is a far greater number of smaller operators relying on subcontract-
ing by large companies to access loads frommajor exporters. This level of the market is not
concentrated and entry barriers are generally surmountable. However, there is a high rate
of exit given that smaller transporters tend to use older vehicles and invest less in main-
tenance, IT systems and fleet redundancy, and typically do not achieve efficiencies in their
operations. This means they often offer weak competitive constraint to large companies
other than by undercutting on price.
3.2 Refrigerated transport
Markets for refrigerated transport outside of South Africa are highly concentrated with few
large operators. In Malawi, for example, Bollore Africa is the largest broker involved with
refrigerated loads (through subcontracting to trucking companies), in a concentrated
trucking market where there are only four reputable trucking companies that service
refrigerated loads. High concentration, low demand and high entry costs in Malawi
result in rates which are relatively high for reefer trucks. The same generally applies in
the Zimbabwean market for refrigerated transport wherein Lonrho Logistics, which is
the only major regional player, operates a reefer fleet of less than 30 vehicles in competition
with South African operators such as HFR with just under 200 vehicles. The South African
market was estimated to have more than 7000 refrigerated vehicles in 2011 (although the
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majority consist of small vehicles less prominent in cross-border transport) (Oppelt et al.,
2015). HFR forms part of a category of large specialist trucking firms that operate primarily
in the transportation of perishables in the region. These companies operate in close com-
mercial relationships with the larger logistics operators such as Imperial, Vector, Value,
Bidvest, Unitrans andHestony that offer one-stop, bundled services including warehousing
and supply chain management to large food producers and retail groups.
Customers, such as retail chains, with frequent and large loads prefer to contract with a
single major logistics provider to minimise transaction and administrative costs. Large
multinational forwarding and clearing firms specialise in broker services, but integrate ver-
tically into trucking and storage through subcontracting relationships with preferred
transport companies to provide comprehensive services. However, this also means that
small- and medium-sized truckers cannot participate in large contracts other than
through subcontracting arrangements which are said to significantly disadvantage them
due to low margins earned.
Small operators charge 10–15% less than the large operators given lower overheads and
expenditure on maintenance of vehicles. However, customers with perishable goods have
strict requirements in terms of maintaining the correct temperature and cleanliness of
fridge units. Grocery retailers in the different countries indicated that they valued
reliability and timeliness (transit times) most in evaluating transporters, over flexibility,
frequency and loss and damages. As such, service-level standards are fixed in the terms
of contracts with retailers, which apply to any subcontracted firms also. Large clients
will pay more for a reliable and comprehensive service, and as a result transporters
promote themselves on the basis of reputation, low accident rates, financial position, man-
agement structures, and track record. Many small- and medium-sized firms often lack a
strong track record which makes it difficult to win large retail customers.
The requirements of retail groups are complex and in most cases extend beyond the
capabilities of transport or forwarding companies. For example, Manica, which is one
of the largest multinational forwarding agents in the region, has chosen not to compete
for forwarding of FMCG (fast-moving consumer goods) and perishables partly because
the requirements in terms of staff training, expertise and operational systems are extensive
in order to fully integrate with large retailers. These requirements can constitute a barrier
to entry for smaller rivals combined with significantly higher entry costs on refrigerated
vehicles. Outside of South Africa, the level of demand often does not justify the entry
and maintenance costs incurred, even when second-hand vehicles are purchased for
refrigerated transport, such that markets are highly concentrated.
4. Rates and costs for road freight and the impact of competition
Transport rates and costs for reefer and ordinary transportation are drawn from the
detailed interviews.5 These rates are then compared to benchmarks defined for efficient
transport in the region and from previous studies.
5In the underlying research study, respondents were asked based on standardised interview guides to indicate the average
rates paid or charged in 2015 for the transportation of a particular type of good, for example, perishable items, by city
pairing where applicable. Responses were given in US Dollars, or in local currency terms in which case the rates were
converted using annual average exchange rates. Unless otherwise stated, rates included in tables are based on an
average of the average rates stated by respondents.
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4.1 Road freight rates
In Table 1 the average rate charged for trucking on each city-pair route is reflected for
ordinary flatbed trucking (28–30-ton equivalent trucks, non-refrigerated) typically used
for commodity transport and non-specialised loads. The rate is the amount paid to the
trucking company for the trip also reflected in US dollars per ton per kilometre (tkm)
which is the unit price of transport. The rates include only trucking-related costs such
as fuel, insurance, expected tolls, driver and parking fees and petty cash. In the table
the average rate refers to the average of the import and export rates charged for 2015.
For example, on the pair ‘Lusaka-Johannesburg’, the import rate is for the leg from
Johannesburg to Lusaka, and the export rate is for the corresponding return leg to
Johannesburg.
A few important observations can be made. In absolute terms, import rates to Lusaka,
Harare and Lilongwe (each in landlocked countries) are always higher than export (out-
bound) rates. In the case of Lusaka-Johannesburg the import rate is around double the rate
for the corresponding outgoing leg, which is largely driven by the lack of return loads for
trucks once goods have been delivered. Truckers therefore factor in the costs of returning
the truck (often empty) to the city of origin. The average rate per tkm for the relatively
shorter distanced Lusaka-Harare route is almost double that on any of the other routes,
which reflects economies of distance over longer distances as well as competitive dynamics
on the route as discussed below.
In Table 2 the rates for refrigerated transport charged for individual legs between cities
for 2015 are shown. We focus on the rate for trips originating in Johannesburg to the other
cities as South African imports of perishables from the other countries are negligible. The
domestic transport rate between Johannesburg and Cape Town in South Africa is also
included here as a comparator for efficient transport, as discussed below.
The total prices charged for trips using refrigerated transportation are significantly
higher than rates for non-refrigerated transport. The difference partly reflects higher
energy costs in maintaining cool temperatures in the fridge unit and higher investment
and maintenance costs associated with refrigeration units. Transport companies generally
charge high mark-ups for refrigerated transportation and low demand outside South
Africa has made it unviable for many firms to remain in the market, resulting in high
levels of concentration. Compared to Johannesburg-Cape Town, cross-border rates will
be higher to reflect additional hassle and risk borne by the transporter, including higher
costs of insurance and border delays (which imply additional costs for refrigeration, for
example).
4.2 Assessing against benchmarks for efficient transport and over time
Detailed information on costs is generally difficult to access and compile across different
companies. As such we consider various benchmarks of what efficient transport rates are
in the region and compare the observed rates above to these. This approach allows for an
assessment of the relative levels of competition and efficiency on different routes as well as
an evaluation of different factors which may drive differences with benchmarks.
For non-refrigerated transport we consider a benchmark rate for efficient transport in
the region of $0.04 per tkm for several reasons. This rate is in line with the lower bound of
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rates for the Lusaka-Johannesburg route which is considered by transporters and in pre-
vious studies to be the most competitive in Southern Africa with high demand and several
different trucking companies from South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe competing to
supply services (Raballand et al., 2008; Teravaninthorn & Raballand, 2009). Given
current constraints in terms of border delays, we argue that this rate could be even
lower than the average $0.06 per tkm and closer to international comparators. For
example, transport rates in Pakistan, Brazil, United States, China and France, where trans-
port is generally considered to be more efficient, were in the range $0.02–0.05 per tkm in
2007 (Teravaninthorn & Raballand, 2009; Rashid & Minot, 2010).6 Rates of $0.04 per tkm
and below could therefore be considered as ‘target’ rates for efficient transport in the
region if certain inefficiencies are addressed.
In refrigerated transport we take the rate charged for the route between Johannesburg
and Cape Town as the guideline efficient rate, at $0.06 per tkm. This rate is indicative of
rates on a highly competitive route with multiple operators, absent any additional risks
associated with cross-border transit and delays. Firms in the region with lower overhead
costs, lower labour costs and lower fixed investment costs (purchasing second-hand,
imported vehicles) could potentially charge rates even lower than this and as such it is
likely to be a conservative estimate.
In terms of ordinary trucks, the average rates observed in the region are marginally
above the benchmark applied, and the rate for Lusaka-Harare is nearly three times
the benchmark. For Lusaka-Johannesburg and Lilongwe-Johannesburg the import
rates are double the benchmark rate, even though export rates are in line. This suggests
the extent to which transport rates could come down on these routes – the lower export
rate accounts for broadly the same distance, costs and border crossings when returning
to Johannesburg with a load as the import rate although a lower rate is charged. Effec-
tively, rates on the import leg from Johannesburg could be reduced over time to align
Table 1. Average non-refrigerated truck rates, 2015.
Route Distance (km) Export rate ($) Import rate ($) Average rate ($/ton/km) & [range]
Lusaka – Harare 495 1500 1800 0.11 [0.10–0.12]
Lusaka – Johannesburg 1576 1800 3660 0.06 [0.04–0.08]
Harare – Maputo 1286 1350 1950 0.04 [0.03–0.05]
Lilongwe – Johannesburg 1863 2100 3950 0.06 [0.04–0.08]
Note: Rates relating to 28- to 30-ton flatbed tri-axle truck and equivalent, based on average of import and export rate
charged.
Source: Author’s own calculation based on information from various interviews.
Table 2. Average refrigerated truck rates per leg, 2015.
From To Distance (km) Total rate ($) $/ton/km
Johannesburg Harare 1121 4498 0.13
Johannesburg Lilongwe 1863 5040 0.09
Johannesburg Lusaka 1576 4548 0.10
Johannesburg Cape Town 1398 2352 0.06
Notes: Rates for a 40-ft refrigerated container or a reefer container loaded on a 30-ton flatbed truck.
Source: Author’s own calculation based on information from various interviews.
6There are almost no recent international studies with reliable comparators that could be applied in this case, or for refriger-
ated transport.
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with the benchmark level or below. Importantly however, transporters stated that they
are generally only willing to charge less on the outgoing leg if they are guaranteed a
return load.
The Harare-Maputo route has slightly different competitive dynamics between oper-
ators. The rates are very competitive which is due to aggressive rivalry from Mozambican
transporters on the route.
Total rates for Lilongwe-Johannesburg and Lusaka-Johannesburg are similar despite a
marginally longer distance travelled. The route from Johannesburg to Lilongwe has three
border crossings including via Zimbabwe (passing through Beitbridge which is the most
constrained border post) andMozambique over a significant transport distance, compared
to two on Lusaka-Johannesburg. This suggests that the Lilongwe-Johannesburg rate
should be higher in general, although increased competition has had a downward effect
on rates.
Ncube et al. (2017) assess 2014 rates in Southern Africa which can be compared to the
above rates for Lusaka-Johannesburg. Combined with information from other transpor-
ters, the rate from Johannesburg to Lusaka in 2014 was on average $165/ton (or
$0.105 per tkm). The price charged for the same route in 2015 appears to have come
down further by around 26% to $122/ton (or $0.08 per tkm). This is consistent with
the findings that routes to and from Zambia (Lusaka) have become more competitive
and cheaper in recent years due in part to greater rivalry from foreign transporters
(some of which have subsidiaries registered in Zambia) (Raballand et al., 2008; Ncube
et al., 2017). However, there are exchange rate effects and decreases in fuel prices
during 2015 that have an important impact. Export rates from Zambia to South Africa
appear to have also come down from around $110/ton in 2014 (Ncube et al., 2017) to
just below $70/ton by 2015.
Similarly, Lall et al. (2009) estimated rates from locations in Malawi to international
destinations in the region to be on average $0.08 per tkm. However, the rate from Lilongwe
to Johannesburg has been halved from around $149/ton based on Lall et al. (2009) to $70–
75/ton in 2015. Two important factors are considered to have resulted in this change on
Malawian routes. The first is the increasing loads from South Africa to Malawi, as well as
the availability of backhaul of Malawian tobacco exports going to the Durban port directly
(via Johannesburg) and to Johannesburg for processing in some cases. Furthermore, the
increased presence of foreign transporters in general on Malawian routes has led to
rates being competed down. Fuel rates in Malawi have also decreased significantly by
2015 which has enhanced the competitiveness of Malawian transporters that operate on
these routes.
For refrigerated trucking a very high margin is applied on most of the routes when
compared to the benchmark. For all of the cross-border routes originating in Johannes-
burg, the mark-ups over the benchmark range from 50% (for Johannesburg-Lusaka
which is considered to be more competitive) to 117%.
In thinking about the questions set out initially, the data above show that transport
prices particularly on the export leg from South Africa are high relative to benchmarks
for efficient transport and international standards. However, the assessment also demon-
strates that routes where there is a greater level of rivalry tend to have lower transport
rates, other things equal.
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5. What are the causes of high road freight rates in Southern Africa?
High rates on certain routes cannot be fully explained by costs associated with transport
and we focus here on additional contributors to high rates. While fuel prices are relatively
high in Malawi and Zambia (currently accounting for 40–50% of operating costs on
average), these have come down recently yet margins on some routes remain high. We
consider the effect of an imbalance in trade flows and border delays.
5.1 The effect of an imbalance in production and trade
South African exports, particularly of perishable goods, are not matched by sufficient
return flows from Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe which is exacerbated by the limits on
the types of goods that can be carried on reefers. This situation may change as Zambia
and other countries gradually increase productive capacity and diversify towards export-
ing various processed and manufactured items. For example, Zambia’s non-copper mer-
chandise exports into the region including electrical equipment and machinery, sulphur,
animal feed and residues from the food industry have already grown substantially since the
early 2000s with potential for further growth in some areas such as sugar exports (World
Bank, 2014).
South African exports of perishable goods to Malawi and Zambia have almost doubled
since 2010 while those to Zimbabwe have slowed but remain sizeable. For Zambia, the
most significant growth has been in fruit and vegetable imports whereas for Malawi
growth is led by increases in imports of meat and fruit products.
There are flows of commodities from Zambia in particular (largely copper) that are
transported either to locations in South Africa for processing or to Durban. Copper
exports from Zambia present an opportunity for obtaining backhaul from South Africa.
The same applies to tobacco exports from Malawi, although of course these are more sea-
sonal. These factors contribute significantly to the lower rates available on the Lusaka-
Johannesburg and Lilongwe-Johannesburg routes. Compared with the other routes
assessed, the greater availability of loads in both directions also attracts truckers to the
Lusaka-Johannesburg route.
Truckers estimate that rates charged for the return leg to Johannesburg are on average
70% of the outgoing rate for transportation of non-refrigerated loads. The examples of
Lusaka-Johannesburg and Lilongwe-Johannesburg show that the differences can be far
greater and up to half of import rates from South Africa. Taking a conservative approach,
the total rate from Johannesburg to Lusaka of $3660 could be brought down to around the
average of the import and export rate or 70% of the outgoing rate (at $2600) if return loads
were regularly available, other things equal.
5.2 The effect of border delays
Each route is affected by border delays arising from the government administrative pro-
cesses or incomplete information from the customer or broker. There have been signifi-
cant improvements, however. For example, the introduction of a one-stop border post
(OSBP) at Chirundu (between Zambia and Zimbabwe) has continued to increase efficien-
cies since 2009 and has had a downward effect on rates (Curtis, 2009; TradeMark,
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undated). The effective implementation of pre-clearance of goods has been an important
contributor particularly because sealed, pre-cleared loads are able to proceed through the
border with minimal inspection delays. Freight companies with good IT systems and for-
warding capabilities are able to use pre-clearance to their advantage. On the other hand,
the expected transit time through Beitbridge (between South Africa and Zimbabwe) is two
days (Curtis, 2014), partly because goods are effectively required to be cleared on the Zim-
babwean and South African side. Other main constraints identified through the interviews
are as follows:
. Clearance systems between South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe do not interoperate
and do not have connectivity with one another, although it is apparently technically
possible to do so. Bottlenecks also arise when leaving the SACU (Southern African
Customs Union) countries due to the use of different electronic systems, tariff struc-
tures and coding of certain products for tax and duty purposes.
. Zambia does not give preference to transporters of time-sensitive goods although we
understand that this is to be addressed.
. Some border gates, such as Chirundu (between Zambia and Zimbabwe) do not operate
on a 24-hour basis which implies queues and parking fees even for time-sensitive
refrigerated transport. Authorities are apparently working towards extending hours
gradually.
Byiers & Vanheukelom (2014) found that delays at border crossings can cost up to $300 a
day for an 8-axle truck. In 2015, delays at the borderwere estimated by transporters to cost at
least $400 a day or $13/ton. This provides a useful benchmark for understanding the costs
incurred by a truck operator including additional driver time, petty cash, parking fees and
the opportunity costs of servicing less clients due to longer roundtrips. For reefers, there are
additional refrigeration costs incurred and possible obsolescence of goods.
Removing the impact of the typical delay of two days on the one-way rate charged from
Johannesburg to Lusaka of $3660 or $122/ton (Table 1) could have a large impact, other
things equal. Based on $26/ton for two days’ delay the rate could decrease to $96/ton
($0.06 per tkm) which is a 21% difference and closer to the efficient benchmarks identified.
5.3 Summary of impact of increased competition, delays and availability of
return loads
More intense competition between transporters in combination with other factors on the
route from Johannesburg to Lusaka has seen rates decline from $165/ton to $122/ton (a
reduction of approximately $0.027 per tkm or 26% on this route).
Eliminating a further two days of delay could bring rates down to around $96/ton or
$0.06 per tkm (a further reduction of $0.016 per tkm). On this conservative basis, the
rate is more in line with the efficient benchmark. The estimated total decrease in rates
is $69/ton, or a 42% saving, although more detailed data is required to assess the full impli-
cations which is not currently available in the region.
Rates could be reduced even further with more return loads. Export rates from Zambia
to South Africa have also come down from around $110/ton in 2014 (Ncube et al., 2017) to
$67/ton by 2015. With additional savings from eliminating even one day’s delay on this
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route, the price on the export leg could be reduced to $54/ton, and a total reduction from
2014 prices of $56/ton. To place this in context, the price of a ton of Zambian soya bean in
2015 was around $400/ton (delivered in Johannesburg), such that the combined saving
against the price of the product is approximately 14%. A further reduction could signifi-
cantly enhance the competitiveness of soya bean landed in South Africa and perhaps
increase the viability of exports from Zambia and other countries competing with deep
sea imports to South Africa.
6. What are the implications for industrial development and integration?
The rapid internationalisation of South African retail chains such that their supply chains
already stretch across borders in the region suggests that the challenges of integration can
be addressed (Das Nair et al., 2018). However, this has most likely come at significant cost
to the businesses which could be reduced substantially through effective regulation and
administration. As discussed, retailers have been prepared to pay more to obtain compre-
hensive and efficient services. The implications of this are important.
The question is whether regulatory and administrative systems can be used to make
efficient transport available for all categories of users. The largest service providers lever-
age reputation and advanced administrative systems to circumvent bottlenecks, including
the ability to place agents at border posts that facilitate documentation and interactions
with authorities. Information from the interviews suggests that they also benefit from
being able to pass through border posts with limited searches on their vehicles which is
a function of established reputations and familiarity with the processes. Through the
associations and networks it appears that brokers are also able to influence regulation
to favour the largest companies, including strengthening regulations against ‘briefcase’
brokers that are potential rivals. Coordination between the brokers (possibly covering
the whole region) also means that prices and standards for these services are aligned
and not reflective of competition.
Small-scale importers and exporters may not have similar capabilities which points to
an important role for border agencies and policymakers in easing transit procedures and
costs. The discussion in the previous section highlights the impact of enabling greater
competition and removing delays at the border (partly from interventions such as the
OSBP). The estimated effect on the routes considered was to nearly halve transport rates.
Developing industrial capacity across the region outside of South Africa is likely to lead
to lower transport rates overall over the medium- to long-term. Increased access to return
loads has a potential effect of reducing rates by around 30% on conservative estimates,
although more detailed data is required to assess this further.
Regulation has an important role to play in enhancing competition between transpor-
ters. First, competition can be enhanced through enabling entry, licensing and passage of
transporters. In Zambia from the late 2000s a focus was placed on ensuring interoperabil-
ity and harmonising of rules for trade and transit with neighbouring countries including
easing permit processes and finalising bilateral agreements (Raballand et al., 2008). For
example, a single permit system was introduced for transit between Zimbabwe and
Zambia (RTSA, 2014). An important feature of opening up the market was making it poss-
ible for foreign operators to compete on Zambian cross-border routes and exposing
Zambian transporters to competition from other operators in the region (Raballand
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et al., 2008). Deregulation in the early 2000s also led to an influx of new transporters
including foreign companies with registered businesses in Zambia. Furthermore, the
import duty on second-hand commercial trucks and trucking equipment was apparently
lifted in 2008/9 allowing more transporters to bring in cheaper used vehicles (Ncube et al.,
2017). Together, these factors have enabled greater rivalry on Zambian routes which is
enhanced by the continued improvements in the implementation of the Chirundu
OSBP which seems to have now reached a high level of effectiveness since implementation
in 2009, despite challenges (Woolfrey & Tshuma, 2013; TradeMark, undated).
There remain other challenges to greater competition in cross-border transport. For
example, in Malawi there are indications that the transporters’ association has in the
past issued recommended rates for transport (Ncube et al., 2017). In addition, there is evi-
dence from the interviews of coordinated behaviour between major brokers in Zimbabwe
and Malawi whereby guideline rates are published by the association for different services.
In Zambia only a select group of companies receive contracts to transport copper for the
large mines. This can be efficiency-enhancing by eliminating the hassle factor for mining
clients that will pay more for convenience and reliability, but can also have the effect of
preventing competition from capable transporters that could compete on lower rates
for those contracts.
In South Africa the presence of a few large integrated logistics firms such as Imperial
with exclusive access to large producers and clients effectively means that in some seg-
ments of the market competition is limited. For example, the South African retailers
and major food producers tend to contract with one main logistics firm that services
their entire business and has the capacity in terms of fleet, storage, warehousing, refriger-
ation units and supply chain management technology to do so. Even large rivals of Imper-
ial, which has made significant investments in capacity most recently, are constrained in
terms of storage and distribution capacity to compete for Imperial’s largest clients. In the
case of Shoprite, the leading retailer in terms of expansion of operations in the region,
logistics functions are internalised through a related firm Freshmark which mostly uses
a set of preferred transporters from South Africa to export goods, effectively limiting
access for other transport operators.
7. Conclusion
The factors that drive high transport costs in the region are a combination of structural
issues and weaknesses in the administration and regulation of cross-border transport.
On the one hand, the imbalance in production and trade flows between the countries
means that return loads are limited. As such one-way transport costs from South Africa
to Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe are high meaning inputs to production and food pro-
ducts are more expensive. On the other hand, bottlenecks in the administrative systems for
crossing borders mean that transport costs are more expensive by at least $13/ton.
Addressing these issues is critical for various reasons. There are important links established
in the literature between upgrading road infrastructure and increasing trade. Improved infra-
structure, more broadly, also contributes to growth in productivity and output. It is also clear
that deficient road infrastructure networks undermine the potential for greater trade between
countries, primarily through the effect on the costs of transit and relative competitiveness of
goods. These considerations should place the challenges addressed in this paper at the centre
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of current efforts by SADC and others to develop industrial capacity and regional value
chains. A key contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that along with infrastructure
investments, administrative and regulatory bottlenecks are just as important in terms of
their effect on competitiveness and competition, which should be a consideration for asses-
sing policy and transport networks in developing countries generally.
Intra-regional links have not been strong in the past as evidenced by the slow
progress towards transport sector liberalisation and low levels of intra-regional trade in
the 1990s and early 2000s. However, transport networks on main trunk routes have
improved considerably and transit times have been reduced. Opportunities exist therefore
to deepen integration through further improvements in border processes and using regu-
lation to open up for cross-border rivalry between transporters as part of regional industri-
alisation strategies.
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